Fifty years of German-Israeli diplomatic relations: whither the miracle of reconciliation? by Asseburg, Muriel
www.ssoar.info
Fifty years of German-Israeli diplomatic relations:
whither the miracle of reconciliation?
Asseburg, Muriel
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Asseburg, M. (2015). Fifty years of German-Israeli diplomatic relations: whither the miracle of reconciliation? (SWP
Comment, 27/2015). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und
Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-432460
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
 Stiftung  
Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute  
for International and 
Security Affairs  
SW
P
 C
om
m
en
ts
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Fifty Years of German-Israeli 
Diplomatic Relations 
Whither the Miracle of Reconciliation? 
Muriel Asseburg 
The 12th of May 2015 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the inauguration of diplomatic 
relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel. While Ger-
many’s genocide of the European Jews means that these will never be normal relations, 
the anniversary sees leading representatives of both countries lauding the almost miracu-
lous bond of trust and close web of contacts that have grown between them. And in-
deed, with no other country in the Middle East is Germany so closely associated. Never-
theless, reconciliation has remained largely a project of the elites, and the two societies 
are currently growing apart rather than together. Also, differences over a two-state 
settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are casting a heavy shadow over the rela-
tionship. Germany’s political elite and society should therefore take the anniversary as 
an occasion to reflect on the meaning of Germany’s historical responsibility and the 
implications for its policy towards Israel. 
 
After the rupture in civilisation of the 
Shoah it appeared unlikely that Germany, 
as the “country of the perpetrators”, and 
Israel, as the “country of the victims”, 
would ever come to any kind of closer co-
operation. Indeed, in the 1950s there was 
resistance, above all but not exclusively in 
Israel, to any rapprochement of the two 
young states. Yet from the outset, relations 
were not shaped only by the past: While 
Germany’s special responsibility for the 
state of Israel has dominated the public 
discourse, cooperation has in reality always 
been driven by mutual economic and secu-
rity interests. Since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations German governments 
have worked to deepen ties in the political, 
economic, military and social spheres. 
The relationship was initially exclusively 
between the Federal Republic (West Ger-
many) and Israel, as the German Democrat-
ic Republic refused to accept responsibility 
for the crimes of the Nazi regime. Reunifi-
cation then made the Federal Republic’s 
the only German policy towards Israel. 
Close Bilateral Cooperation 
Today the close relations are best expressed 
by the joint cabinet meetings held alter-
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nately in Berlin and Jerusalem every year or 
two since 2008. Aside from Israel, Germany 
holds comparable regular top-level meetings 
only with its closest European partners, 
as well as Russia, China, India and recently 
also Turkey. 
The last government consultations in 
February 2014 produced, amongst other 
understandings, a consular agreement 
allowing Israeli citizens to seek assistance 
from German representations in countries 
where Israel has no diplomatic or consular 
presence. The two countries also agreed to 
expand their joint development projects 
in sub-Saharan Africa, above all on agri-
culture, water and desertification. Israel, 
which itself received German development 
aid until 1996 and only joined the OECD 
in 2010, has recently become a partner for 
Germany in this field. Although its tech-
nical expertise in the water sector is un-
deniable, Israel’s discriminatory water 
policy in the occupied territories speaks 
against such cooperation, as it leaves the 
amount of drinking water supplied to the 
Palestinian population well below the 
minimum recommended by WHO. Israel 
thus violates the human right to water 
and its duties as occupying power. 
Trade, Military and 
Armament Cooperation 
Trade relations are close albeit asymmet-
rical. In 2014 Germany was Israel’s fourth-
largest bilateral trade partner, while Israel 
was forty-sixth of all Germany’s trade part-
ners and third in the Middle East (by vol-
ume). An especially brisk trade has devel-
oped in the field of armaments, profiting 
from the close cooperation between the two 
countries’ defence ministries, armed forces 
and intelligence services. 
On the one side, Germany possesses a 
strong interest in Israel’s high-tech arms 
industry, in particular its drone technology. 
Since the 1990s Germany has leased un-
manned aircraft from Israel to deploy in 
former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. In joint 
training and exercises German interest con-
centrates on profiting from Israel’s prac-
tical experience in military counter-terror-
ism, in particular house-to-house fighting. 
On the other side, Israel was the third-
largest recipient of German arms exports 
between 2009 and 2013, with missile 
defence systems and submarines especially 
prominent. Germany donated two sub-
marines free of charge and sold the others 
at a considerable discount or in exchange 
for arms purchases in Israel. The fifth of 
currently six contracted submarines was 
launched in April 2013 and is likely to be 
delivered soon. The German government 
has justified broad subsidies for arms 
deliveries in terms of its commitment to 
Israel’s security, originally in light of Ger-
man support for Iraq’s missile and arms 
programmes and Iraqi attacks on Israel in 
1991, later increasingly with reference to 
the Iranian threat. Germany also possesses 
an interest in placing orders for its own 
arms industry and shipyards. 
Although these arms exports contradict 
the principle of not exporting to regions 
of tension, they have been justified under 
the “if it floats it’s OK” rule attributed to 
former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Gen-
scher. This was shorthand for exporting 
defensive weapons systems seen as unsuited 
for repression in the occupied territories. 
This reading ignores, however, the pos-
sibility of using submarines for offensive 
purposes, such as landing commandos, as 
well the aspect of proliferation, to which 
Germany contributes by supplying carrier 
technologies. In fact, Israel has converted 
its submarines to enable them to fire cruise 
missiles capable of carrying nuclear war-
heads. Although one could argue that Ger-
many makes a decisive contribution to 
Israel’s security by supporting its seaborne 
second-strike capability, this capability 
actually risks escalating tensions in the 
region – especially in view of Israeli threats 
to conduct military strikes against the 
Iranian nuclear programme. 
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The Politics of Societal 
Reconciliation 
Alongside a number of civil society actors, 
the German government has led the way 
in promoting relations also at the level 
of society through a great diversity of 
exchange and cooperation programmes. 
Various projects largely initiated by the 
German government (as well as a few bi-
lateral foundations) play an eminent role, 
focusing on exchange and cooperation by 
politicians, academics, businesspeople, 
journalists and artists. For more than fifty 
years the German Federal Agency for Civic 
Education has been running Israel visits 
for opinion leaders. More than one hun-
dred German towns and districts are now 
twinned with Israeli counterparts. Since 
the 1950s about 700,000 young Germans 
and Israelis have participated in youth 
exchanges or voluntary service (mostly 
Germans going to Israel). Currently about 
nine thousand school students and young 
adults participate in such exchange pro-
grammes each year. 
Normalisation and Criticism 
Despite all these initiatives, German-Israeli 
relations have remained largely a project 
of the elites. Apart from those directly 
involved in exchanges, they have had little 
effect on the two societies, certainly a good 
deal less than the media. They have thus 
made only a small contribution to mutual 
understanding, still less to a reconciliation 
of perspectives. 
Germans and Israelis have drawn very 
different lessons from history. Put simply, 
in the country of the perpetrators the motto 
“Never again war!” has been translated into 
a political culture of military restraint, 
multilateralism, and relinquishing of sov-
ereignty. The land of the victims, following 
the dictum “Never again Auschwitz!” has 
placed its faith in resolute independence, 
military strength and nuclear deterrence. 
These approaches have been further re-
inforced by the respective geopolitical 
environments. It is therefore no surprise 
that there is estrangement and incompre-
hension between the two countries’ popu-
lations. 
At the same time perceptions of the 
respective other have changed considerably 
over the past decades. Broadly speaking, 
Israelis’ views of Germany have become 
more positive, Germans’ ideas about Israel 
more negative. Still, comprehensive studies 
based on opinion surveys reveal a less 
dramatic picture than that suggested for 
example by anti-Semitic incidents in several 
German cities in connection with the 2014 
Gaza War, or emerging from single-issue 
polls, especially when conducted at times 
of war. 
Germans perceive Israel largely in the 
twin contexts of the loaded German past 
and the Middle East conflict. In contrast 
to their political elites, growing numbers 
of ordinary Germans refuse to treat their 
country’s historical responsibility as a duty 
to ensure Israel’s security. Rather, they see 
German history implying a special respon-
sibility to protect human rights and to 
engage to prevent war. In a Bertelsmann 
study published in spring 2015, only 40 per-
cent of those surveyed agreed that Germany 
bore a special responsibility towards the 
Jewish people. About two-thirds – and al-
most 80 percent of 18- to 29-year-olds – 
expressed resentment at still being held 
responsible for the crimes against the Jews. 
Drawing a line under the past is favoured 
by 55 percent of Germans. In contrast, 
almost three quarters of Jewish respond-
ents in Israel believe that Germany con-
tinues to have a special responsibility 
towards the Jewish people, and 77 percent 
reject drawing a line under the past. 
Germans have long ceased to regard 
Israel as the underdog David threatened by 
an overpowering Arab Goliath, as was still 
the case during the 1967 war. Israeli policy 
towards the Palestinians meets with par-
ticular criticism by Germans, who blame 
Israel at least as much as the Palestinians 
for the lack of progress in the peace process 
and recurrences of violence. Israel’s use of 
force is often perceived as disproportionate. 
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At the same time there is little regard for 
Israel’s difficult security environment. 
In this context Germans are also critical 
of their own government’s policy towards 
Israel. While politicians across political 
parties again reflexively took the side of 
Israeli in the last Gaza War in July/August 
2014 and emphasised its right to self-
defence, almost two-thirds of those inter-
viewed in August 2014 by ARD Deutsch-
landTrend held Israel and Hamas equally 
responsible for the escalation. A large 
majority also held that Germany should 
remain neutral rather than taking sides. 
According to the aforementioned Bertels-
mann study, a clear two-thirds majority 
reject arms deliveries to Israel. 
On the other side, a study by the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation from January 2015, 
based on surveys among Jewish and Arab 
Israelis, shows that more than two thirds 
of Israelis have an overwhelmingly positive 
perception of Germany. Among young 
Israelis, whose image of Germany tends 
more to the negative than the average as 
a result of a school curriculum in which 
Germany is discussed almost exclusively in 
connection with the Shoah, there is para-
doxically currently a Berlin craze. And even 
if most Israelis continue to associate Ger-
many with the Shoah, they also see it as a 
stable Western democracy with a reputa-
tion for innovation, high-quality products 
and good quality of life. Eighty percent of 
the surveyed Israelis regard Germany as an 
important partner, and almost 60 percent 
believe that Israel can rely on Germany 
without reservation. Consequently Israelis 
also wish for Germany to play a more active 
role in international politics. But here their 
expectations are diametrally opposed to 
those of the Germans, as they would like a 
more active Germany to take Israel’s side in 
conflicts with the Palestinians and Iran, to 
stand up for Israeli interests in the Euro-
pean Union and international organisations, 
and support Israel with arms supplies. 
Societies Drifting Apart 
Demographic trends suggest that the two 
societies are likely to drift further apart 
with regard to politics and identity. Ger-
many is today more strongly marked by 
generations and population groups that 
have no personal connection to the Shoah. 
Still, no significant increase in anti-Semi-
tism can be identified in Germany over the 
past ten years. Also, the popular view that 
Muslim immigrants were responsible for 
the anti-Semitic incidents in summer 2014 
is not backed up by the statistics. While 
anti-Semitic slogans heard at demonstra-
tions against the Gaza War came from 
these quarters, the vast majority of anti-
Semitic crimes are clearly attributable to 
right-wing extremists. 
Israel, in turn, is today noticeably less 
characterised by Jews who have immigrated 
from Europe than it was during its early 
years. And the proportion of religious Jews 
in the population is increasing, that of 
secular Jews declining. In 2010 every third 
Israeli child was born to an ultra-Orthodox 
family. This also generates challenges 
for Israeli democracy, associated with the 
spread of the conviction that Jewish law 
(halakha) stands above democratic prin-
ciples (in general or at least in particular 
spheres). 
These developments are also likely to 
deepen the polarisation between Jews and 
Arabs in Israel, which has already been 
exacerbated over recent years by legislation 
designed for example to strengthen the 
Jewish identity of the state. Not only do the 
ultra-Orthodox argue significantly more 
frequently than others to restrict the politi-
cal and economic rights of Arab Israelis. 
Also, a national-religious discourse assert-
ing a claim to Greater Israel has increasing-
ly taken hold, reaching even into parts of 
the population that do not regard them-
selves as religious. Today almost one quarter 
of the Jewish population backs such ideas. 
The correlation between religiosity and 
image of Germany is likely to be a factor 
affecting relations between the two soci-
eties. This is reflected in the study by Kon-
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rad Adenauer Foundation, where 77 per-
cent of secular Jewish Israelis have a posi-
tive image of Germany, but only 42 percent 
of the Orthodox and no more than 31 per-
cent of the ultra-Orthodox. Thus the two 
societies will probably show ever decreasing 
mutual interest while irritations are likely 
to increase. 
Tense Relations 
Despite close bilateral cooperation, the 
political relationship has been character-
ised by tensions between the Merkel and 
Netanyahu governments. The two heads 
of government and their advisers have 
repeatedly had heated telephone exchang-
es, and the German Chancellor has openly 
criticised Israeli settlement policy – al-
though only after US President Barack 
Obama led the way. 
Twenty years after the Oslo Agreements 
between Israel and the PLO (1993–1995) 
there is great frustration in Germany’s 
political elite about the impasse in the 
peace process, for which they hold Benja-
min Netanyahu largely responsible. On-
going settlement activities in the occupied 
territories had eviscerated the credibility 
of the Israeli prime minister’s 2009 com-
mitment to a two-state settlement long 
before his July 2014 announcement that 
there would be no sovereign Palestinian 
State. His March 2015 election campaign 
statements merely confirmed what was 
already evident. 
Berlin has thus found Israeli policy to 
be increasingly in contradiction to its own 
understanding, according to which Israel’s 
security would be best served by a two-state 
agreement with the Palestinians, a com-
prehensive peace settlement with its other 
Arab neighbours, and regional cooperation. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s Germany 
has been actively supporting the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process, the multilateral 
Middle East talks, and EU initiatives aiming 
to integrate Israel into an ever closer web 
of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Since the 
establishment of the Palestinian Authority 
in 1994, Germany has been one of the largest 
donors to the Palestinians, who also receive 
the highest level of per-capita German aid 
and development support. As well as sup-
porting the peace process, Germany has 
seen the establishment of Palestinian state 
institutions as the main priority. 
Yet it can no longer be ignored that sup-
port for the peace process and the Pales-
tinian Authority have contributed not to 
resolving the conflict but to cementing 
a conflictual status quo. De facto Israelis 
and Palestinians have not moved an inch 
towards a two-state settlement. Instead a 
one-state reality has consolidated in which 
Israel maintains almost complete control 
over the entire region between the Medi-
terranean and the River Jordan, where 
residents enjoy different rights depending 
on citizenship, place of residence and 
ethnic/religious categorisation. The Pales-
tinian Territories are fragmented by settle-
ment construction, the separation barrier 
in the West Bank, the sealing off of East 
Jerusalem and the blockade of the Gaza 
Strip, while the political rift between Fatah 
and Hamas further undermines their unity. 
Despite immense donor support over the 
past twenty years, sustainable economic 
development has proved impossible, above 
all because of the ongoing occupation. 
Constants and Gradual Change 
in Berlin 
The German government still adheres to 
most of the constants that have character-
ised German Middle East policy since the 
early 1990s, in particular continuing to in-
sist that any resolution to the Israeli-Pales-
tinian conflict must be an outcome of direct 
bilateral talks. And it continues to regard 
the United States as the main power broker 
and moderator of such negotiations. Berlin 
also regards pressure on Israel as counter-
productive, preferring instead positive in-
centives, and rejects so-called unilateral 
steps (Israeli settlement activities, Palestin-
ian internationalisation efforts) as harmful 
to the peace process. In addition, Chancel-
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lor Angela Merkel feels a very personal obli-
gation to Israel’s well-being and understands 
its security as part of the German raison 
d’état. She thus also complied with Netan-
yahu’s demand to recognise Israel explicitly 
as a Jewish state even though such an eth-
nic/religious definition of identity excludes 
the country’s non-Jewish citizens (who make 
up about 20 percent of the population). 
The lack of progress in the peace process 
has, however, brought about a gradual 
change in Berlin’s policy. Germany no longer 
operates as “Israel’s good ambassador in 
the European Union”, upon which Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak was once able to rely. 
While Berlin is by no means the driving 
force behind an increasingly Israel-critical 
stance within the European Union, it does 
find itself more in the mid-field of Euro-
pean positions. Germany has repeatedly 
attempted to generate joint EU positions, 
but has also ceased seeking to prevent Euro-
pean moves that Israel regards as punitive. 
This applies for example to the suspension 
of an upgrading of the European Union’s 
relations with Israel (that Germany had 
supported and that had in principle already 
been adopted in 2008) after the 2008/2009 
Gaza War, the adoption of EU guidelines 
forbidding as of 2014 the funding of Israeli 
institutions and activities in the territories 
occupied in 1967, or the request to the Euro-
pean Commission to prepare guidelines for 
the labelling of settlement products. 
Berlin has also come to the conclusion 
that international parameters for conflict 
resolution would be helpful for encourag-
ing constructive and goal-oriented negotia-
tions. Together with the United Kingdom 
and France, Germany presented such para-
meters to the UN Security Council in Feb-
ruary 2011, but was unable to have them 
adopted against US rejection. Berlin did 
not, however, support a draft Security 
Council resolution introduced by Jordan 
in December 2014 stipulating an end to 
the occupation by the end of 2017, as the 
German government still rejects any binding 
timeframe or coercive measures, let alone 
an internationally imposed settlement. 
The sharpest expression to date of 
German dissatisfaction with Israeli policy 
remains its abstention in the vote on 
accepting Palestine as a “non-member ob-
server state” at the United Nations General 
Assembly in November 2012. This move 
marked a dilution of Berlin’s position on 
recognition of Palestine. At the same time 
Germany continues to insist that a Pales-
tinian state must emerge from negotiations 
and makes recognition dependent on that. 
Perspectives 
The bilateral relationship is likely to come 
under further pressure in the coming 
months, as the chances of resumption of a 
meaningful peace process are nil, especially 
after the March 2015 Israeli parliamentary 
elections. Already since the last round of 
talks was broken off in April 2014 the par-
ties have been pursuing unilateral steps 
and Israeli-Palestinian relations have steadi-
ly worsened. This trend is set to continue. 
As a consequence the international isola-
tion of Israel will also increase – and with 
it pressure from European partners on Ger-
many to take a clear position and support a 
more resolute European line towards Israel. 
Recommendations 
Seventy years after the liberation of 
Auschwitz and fifty years after the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations, Germany 
and Israel have every reason to celebrate 
the reconciliation of their states. At the 
same time Germany should see the anni-
versary as an opportunity to stage a debate 
about its historical responsibility and to 
critically reassess its policy towards Israel. 
For neither at the political level nor the 
societal can German-Israeli relations be 
isolated from the Middle East conflict. The 
following elements should be taken into 
account in this reflection process: 
Special historical responsibility: A broad 
social and political debate is needed to clari-
fy which specific obligations and policies 
for society as well as domestic and foreign 
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policy ensue today from Germany’s histori-
cal responsibility. 
Expansion of exchange and education 
programmes: In view of the drifting apart 
of the two societies it would be useful to 
pay greater heed to today’s social reality in 
exchange activities and include segments 
of the population that have tended to be 
neglected (immigrant groups in both soci-
eties and non-Jewish minorities and the 
religious sector in Israel). In Germany more 
consistent action must be taken against 
anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia 
through civic education and rigorous judi-
cial prosecution. At the same time, dialogue 
forums that bring together population 
groups with different religious affiliations 
should be supported.  
Engagement in crisis management: The 
realisation of historic responsibility in for-
eign policy should be based on an empathic 
understanding of Israel’s threat percep-
tions, but not on unquestioning adoption 
of Israeli security doctrines. Germany 
should fulfil its responsibility by expanding 
its involvement in regional crisis and con-
flict management. This is all the more 
urgent as Israel finds itself in an extremely 
fragile environment with great risk of 
violent escalation on several fronts. In the 
past Germany has offered its services to 
mediate prisoner exchanges between Israel 
and Hezbollah or Hamas, and it would 
certainly make sense to employ the trust 
gained through such activities to prevent 
future military clashes. 
In the same vein, Berlin and its European 
Union partners should engage actively for 
a resolution of the conflict over the Gaza 
Strip, rather than relying on Egyptian or 
other initiatives. One obvious starting point 
would be the German foreign minister’s 
proposals of summer 2014, including a 
deployment of EU monitors to overcome 
the blockade and create the preconditions 
for reconstruction, economic activity and 
a decent life in the coastal enclave. 
General principles of German policy: Even 
in its special relationship with Israel, Ger-
many’s actions should be guided by respect 
for human rights, observance of inter-
national law and preference for peaceful 
conflict resolution. Double standards – 
for example supplying weapons that serve 
offensive as well as defensive purposes or 
joint exercises where German forces seek to 
profit from Israeli experience in the context 
of the occupation – must be avoided. Policy 
fields where Israel violates human rights 
in the Palestinian Territories should be 
excluded from development cooperation 
projects. 
Active commitment to the two-state 
settlement: If Germany is committed to the 
existence of Israel as the state of the Jewish 
people, there is no point continuing a policy 
that indirectly consolidates the illegal 
occupation and prevents a two-state settle-
ment. The approach pursued to date, that 
conflict resolution must be the outcome of 
bilateral talks between the conflict parties, 
has proven ineffective. Germany and its 
partners in Europe and in the Middle East 
Quartet (United States, Russian Federation, 
United Nations, European Union) should 
therefore agree not only on a Security 
Council resolution detailing parameters for 
a two-state settlement but also to stipulate 
a binding timeframe and provide a mecha-
nism for internationally supervised imple-
mentation. At the same time a good deal 
more effort must then be put into keeping 
open the option of a viable Palestinian 
state, for example by insisting on a settle-
ment moratorium. Recognition of a Pales-
tinian state would also be consistent with 
that policy. 
Unless such a commitment, in which 
confrontation with Israel is unavoidable, 
is pursued energetically, a two-state settle-
ment will become ever more elusive. In this 
case serious consideration must be given 
to alternative approaches to safeguard the 
rights of all the inhabitants of the area 
of the former British Mandate of Palestine, 
even if they are incompatible with the 
national ambitions of Israelis and Pales-
tinians. 
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